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AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARRIAGE AND DEPENDENCY 







Within the Navy, married active duty service members and unwed single sailors 
with dependents are entitled to receive additional benefits compared to their single 
counterparts.  The majority of these benefits are received through increases in the service 
member’s Basic Allowance for Housing, Family Separation Allowance and medical 
coverage for spouses and dependents.  This study estimates how much these increases 
cost the Navy.  Data acquired from the Center for Defense Manpower Data Center and 
the Center for Naval Analyses are used to determine the average increase in BAH, FSA 
and medical coverage costs for married sailors and unwed single sailors with dependents.  
Surprisingly, the pay premium for being married or having dependents ranges from only 
4 percent to only 10 percent for all enlisted ranks of E-5 and above and for all officer 
ranks.  This premium is well below the marriage premium in the civilian labor market.  
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There’s an old Navy adage: if the Navy wanted you to marry, they’d issue you a 
wife.  However, a different message could be perceived by a sailor given that the Navy 
offers higher compensation for married personnel.  Studies within the civilian labor force 
have identified several factors that appear to have a significant influence on an 
employee’s compensation.  Several of these influential factors include: age, gender, 
experience, education and training.  One particularly interesting factor is an employee’s 
marital status.  With controls set to minimize the effects of other influencing factors such 
as age, gender or education, a married employee can earn 10 to 40 percent more than 
single counterparts (Korenman, 1991).  The purpose of this study is to measure the cost 
of the marriage premium of active duty Navy personnel. 
While there is little debate over the existence or magnitude of the marriage 
premium, the origin of the marriage premium remains highly contested among labor 
economists.  There are three prevailing theories used to account for the cause of the 
marriage premium.  The first theory attributes the marriage premium to specialization.  
Specialization occurs when a marriage provides a worker with the opportunity to spend 
less time on domestic work and become more specialized in market labor.  The second 
theory attributes the premium to unmerited employer bias toward married employees.  
The third theory attributes the marriage premium to mutually favorable traits.  As such, 
the same characteristics that increase the probability of finding and keeping a spouse are 
also likely to facilitate promotions and higher wages.  The three proposed theories have 
been evaluated extensively using empirical studies of the civilian labor market. 
The marriage premium among active duty military members is the result of 
written policy.  Marriage entitles all active duty service-members and their spouses to 
increased pay, benefits and opportunities.  The gains achieved through marriage occur 
primarily through family separation pay, basic allowance for housing and healthcare.   
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In most studies, the magnitude of the marriage premium of the civilian labor market is 
often quoted to be between 20 to 30 percent.  However, the overall net cost of the 
marriage premium to the military and its branches remains to be measured. 
The former commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E. Mundy Jr., was 
aware of the non-financial costs of married soldiers.  Mundy noticed that with the 
duration and frequency of Marine deployments increasing, there have been increasing 
divorce rates and stresses on families within the Marine Corps.  In addition, Mundy 
surmised that marriage was an inevitable distraction for new Marines.  Furthermore, this 
distraction could reduce the effectiveness of training and readiness.  A married soldier 
would be affected whenever family dilemmas arise, leading to problems such as 
moonlighting, missed training, missed deployments, and emergency leave.  Additionally, 
leaders might find it difficult to punish married servicemen with restrictions or pay 
forfeitures, knowing their families will suffer as well.  Furthermore, the Marines are 
highly dependant upon forming strong bonds among units.  A Marine with a spouse and 
children would be less likely to invest the same level of time and effort in the formation 
of a strong unit bond.  As a result, General Mundy recommended prohibiting marriage 
during a Marine's first years of enlistment.  Unsurprisingly, General Mundy’s 
recommendation was not well received and deemed politically unviable.  The 
recommendation launched an investigation by two assistant defense secretaries and 
numerous military and civilian bureaucrats with the goal of preventing General Mundy’s 
decision.  The investigation produced a 600-page document that finds “no direct, clear, 
meaningful and statistically valid relationship (positive or negative) between marital 








II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The occurrence of a considerably high difference in compensation for married 
workers in comparison to single workers with similar qualities has consistently been 
observed by labor economists.  There is a general consensus about the magnitude of the 
marriage premium within the labor market; most research estimates the premium to be 
about 20 percent and the range of estimates is between 10 and 40 percent.  However, 
there is disagreement over the origin of the marriage premium.  Furthermore, there is 
disagreement as to whether the observed premium is actually the result of marriage or 
just a correlation.  A review of literature reveals three primary hypotheses commonly 
used to account for the observed difference in compensation between married employees 
and their single counterparts. 
Marriage can enable an employee to increase productivity at work in several 
ways.  Most often, the increase in productivity is thought to occur by the division of 
household labor (Figure 1).  A single worker has to divide his time between market 
production and domestic labor.  A decrease in time spent on housework affords an 
opportunity to increase earnings.  The division of domestic labor provided through 
marriage enables a spouse to focus more on market labor production without sacrificing 
domestic labor.  This increased productivity, in turn, would lead to improved 
performance and an increase in the frequency of pay raises as well as promotions.  
Another assumption is that the increase in productivity is the result of the stability and 
encouragement afforded by marriage.  The concept of marriage increasing productivity 
















Market Labor                                                               Household Labor 
Figure 1.   Fiduciary Effect of Market Labor and Household Labor Distribution 
 
A Study by Hyunbae Chun and Injae Lee “Why Do Married Men Earn More: 
Productivity or Marriage Selection” found supporting evidence for the specialization 
theory.  To analyze the possibility of the increased productivity from specialization, they 
decomposed the marriage premium into “a potential gain from marriage and a wage 
penalty associated with the wife’s labor market hours”.  They found that married men 
whose spouse did not participate in the labor market had 31.4 percent greater earnings 
than their single counterparts.  Furthermore, they found that for each additional hour of 
labor that a spouse participates in the labor market, the marriage premium decreased by 6 
percent.  A similar finding was observed by economists McKinley, Blackburn and 
Sanders.  They observed a decrease in the marriage premium of 10 percent from 1967 to 
1988.  This observation could reflect an increase in spouses' participation in the labor 
market and a more equal division of household labor. 
Katarina Richardson’s research on the evolution of the marriage premium in the 
Swedish labor market also identified a decrease in the premium that coincides with a 
more equal division of household labor.  Richardson measured the marriage premium 
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within the Swedish labor market from 1968 to 1991.  During this period several notable 
changes have occurred within the Swedish labor market.  In 1971, Sweden switched from 
joint taxation to individual taxation in addition to other changes that made it more 
profitable for spouses to participate in the labor market.  In addition, the Swedish 
government began to offer heavily subsidized public childcare to all households.  The 
percentage of women who participated in the labor market increased from 54 percent (in 
1965) to 82 percent (in 1989).  Additionally, married men have doubled the amount of 
time spent on household labor while the time spent by married women was cut in half.  
The researchers expanded their study to include cohabitating single men rather than just 
evaluating single and married men. 
Richardson found that the 1968 marriage premium of 23 percent had dropped to 8 
percent by 1991.  A similar decline was found among cohabitating men, from 16 percent 
in 1968 down to 4 percent in 1991.  These findings suggest that the marriage premium is 
indeed related to the division of domestic labor. 
Despite the observations and empirical results that support the productivity 
theory, there are studies available with contradicting results. One investigation 
concerning the origin of the marriage premium used data from the National Survey of 
Families and Households (Hersch and Stratton, 2000).  This survey provides information 
on the time spent on home labor as well as wages for 13,008 households.  Comparing the 
average number of hours spent on domestic labor for single and married workers yielded 
interesting results.  As expected, married men spent less time on tasks such as cleaning or 
cooking.  However, they found little difference between single and married individuals 
and the total amount of time spent on domestic labor.  This observation suggests that 
either the type of domestic labor is more important than the amount of labor or that 
specialization might not be the primary cause of the marriage premium.  Instead, 
employer bias might be more influential in creating the compensation difference. 
Researchers have also found increases in compensation due to employer bias.  
Albeit hard to prove, the idea of compensation differences due to employer bias is 
logical.  The presence of a spouse could afford a greater opportunity for networking and 
building social relationships with employers.  In addition, an employer might attribute 
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unmerited favorable qualities to a married employee.  This, in turn, would lead to a faster 
rate of promotion than unmarried counterparts with similar qualities.  One study has 
identified an increased incidence of favorable performance evaluations for married 
employees (Korenman, Neumark 1991).  This study analyzed company personnel data 
from a large U.S. manufacturing firm.  The data were on white male managers and 
professionals working within the firm.  In addition the data included supervisor 
performance ratings, as well as each worker’s salary.  The performance rating was based 
on a six-point scale, six being the most favorable.  They concluded that the marriage 
premium arises through married personnel occupying the higher job grades and not 
through a higher wage for similar jobs.  They also found that married workers were more 
likely to receive favorable performance ratings from their immediate supervisors.  These 
higher ratings, in turn, increase the probability of promoting and receiving higher wages 
than single employees.  However, it is possible that married personnel receive higher 
ratings because they posses certain characteristics that are favorable both to supervisors 
and to a potential spouse.  Specialization and employer bias suggest that the observed 
marriage premium a specific origin between the theory and the observed premium.  
However, the third theory of unobservable characteristics being valued by both 
employers and potential spouses, suggest that there is no direct cause of the marriage 
premium, but rather a correlation. 
The concept of unobservable characteristics as a driving force of the marriage 
premium has also been widely investigated and supported.  The hypothesis is that the 
wage difference among married and single workers is not the result of employer bias or 
the division of domestic labor.  Instead, the observed wage difference is the result of both 
employers and potential spouses favoring similar characteristics such as a sound work 
ethic, cognitive ability, trustworthiness and reliability.  Interestingly, even traits such as 
attractiveness and charisma could influence both employers and potential spouses.  One 
study supports this theory by observing the marriage premium from shotgun weddings 
(Ginther, Zavodny 1998).  Their study compares the marriage premium of men who had a 
child within seven months of marriage with those who did not.  The assumption is that 
premarital conception makes the marriage a random event and removes issues of 
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selection.  They found that men who married after the woman conceived received higher 
returns from marriage. This suggests that these men did indeed have some unobserved 
trait that increased their likelihood of both attracting and keeping a spouse and having a 
successful career. 
In contrast, another study found no support for the selection theory (Antonovics, 
Town).  This study evaluated the selection theory by using data on identical twins.  The 
data came from the Minnesota Twins Registry which accounts for about 80 percent of the 
total population of surviving intact pairs born in Minnesota from 1936 to 1955.  If the 
selection theory is valid, then identical twins with similar backgrounds and education 
should have similar salaries regardless of marital status.  Of the 128 Twin pairs analyzed, 
24 percent differed in their marital status.  Their results found that the marriage premium 
was still present at 27 percent.  This suggests that the selection might not be the primary 
influence for the origin of the marriage premium. 
It is possible, if not probable, that the overall marriage premium is the net result 
of all three factors combined.  However, which theory accounts for the majority of the 
wage differential remains widely debated.  Despite conflicts pertaining to the source of 
the marriage premium, the magnitude of the premium is widely agreed upon.  Within the 
military, the sources of the marriage premium are easily identifiable.  However, the 
magnitude of the marriage premium within the Department of Defense is unknown.  A 
thorough literature review has found no documentation addressing the overall difference 
in compensation and benefits for married military personnel and their single counterparts.   
The production theory probably does not apply to enlisted Navy personnel.  This 
is because a single enlisted sailor living on a ship or in BEQ has a relatively low amount 
of domestic tasks such as cleaning, food preparation and laundry.  These services are 
provided when living on a ship.  This would not apply to officers who typically live in 
private quarters.  There is a possibility of supervisor bias affecting the marriage premium 
within the Navy.  If a supervisor attributes unmerited favorable characteristics to his 
subordinates, it would be reflected on the subordinate’s evaluations.  These higher 
evaluations would greatly affect a sailor’s probability of promotion.  As such, employer 
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bias could lead to higher pay by advancing the employee to the next higher rank, in 























The marriage premium within the military occurs via increases in both allowances 
and benefits.  The increase in benefits occurs through the free medical care offered to 
active duty members, their spouses and children.  The increase in financial compensation 
is provided primarily through basic allowance for housing (BAH) and family separation 
pay.  Entitlements to increases in compensation are immediately present after the active 
duty member has married and notified his or her service.  In contrast, the marriage 
premium within the civilian labor market is not immediately realized but rather develops 
and increases with years of marriage. Although minor in comparison to differences in 
BAH and medical coverage, additional wage differences for active duty members can 
also be found in the cost of living allowance (COLA), relocation and moving expenses. 
Every service member is entitled to some form of housing.  The manner in which 
housing and BAH is provided depends upon several factors including: rank, location and 
marital status. Married service members usually have the option to reside in free on-base 
housing or live off base and receive a tax-free monetary allowance (Basic allowance for 
housing).  The amount provided for BAH depends upon several factors including: rank, 
location and the number of dependents.  Single service members who are within the pay 
grades of E-4 and below are typically required to live on Navy provided quarters such as 
a ship, barracks or bachelor enlisted quarters.  However, service members who are E-6 
and above are usually given the option to live in private quarters and receive BAH.  
When a service member, regardless of rank, resides in government quarters, he receives a 
partial BAH. 
In general, on-base housing is limited with vacancy sometimes taking more than a 
year to acquire.  In addition, housing is typically reserved for married service members 
with dependents.  As such the size of the house provided is determined by the number of 
dependents.  Aside from not paying rent, there are additional advantages to living on-
base.  Trash collection, water, gas and electric are provided free of charge.  In addition, 
major appliances are provided as well. 
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Those members who do not reside in on-base housing or provided quarters are 
entitled to BAH.  In addition to rank and marital status, the level of BAH is also 
determined by duty station location.  On an annual basis, the amount of BAH for each 
duty location is assessed and adjusted.  Each year, the military hires an independent 
agency to assess the average cost of housing for each area in which a service member 
would likely reside.  The amount of BAH supplied to each member is intended to cover 
100 percent of the total average housing cost. 
Under special circumstances, some service members receive BAH Differential 
(BAH-DIFF) in lieu of the regular BAH.  BAH differential is given to eligible service 
members who do not have legal custody of their child and are paying child support or 
spouse support.  The BAH-DIFF rate is determined by taking the difference between the 
full married rate of BAH and the full single rate of BAH.  To be eligible, the member 
must prove that the amount of child support or spouse support he is obligated to provide 
is equal to or greater than the amount of BAH-DIFF that he would receive.   
Another contributing factor to the compensation difference is the family 
separation allowance (FSA).  Only service members who are married or have dependents 
are eligible for family separation allowance.  In addition to having dependents, the 
service member must, as a result of duty assignment, be away from his/her dependents 
for a period greater than 30 days.  There are two types of FSA, Type I and Type II.  
Service members may be eligible for either or both types of FSA concurrently.  The most 
common type of family separation allowance is Type II.  Eligibility for Type II family 
separation allowance occurs when the military member is required to be away from 
his/her family for a period of 30 days or greater.  This type of allowance compensates for 
the expenses incurred via transportation of dependents, additional expenses incurred from 
a temporary duty assignment and serving at sea.  The purpose of Type I FSA is to 
compensate a service member for added housing expenses resulting from forced 
separation from dependents in addition to having to incur a cost of obtaining private 
housing.  As such Type I FSA is considered to be an additional basic housing allowance 
and is received in addition to their regular BAH. 
 11
Medical care for active duty naval personnel and their families is provided via the 
TRICARE medical system.  The TRICARE system is comprised of combined Army, 
Navy and Air Force medical resources. Additionally, the TRICARE system also uses a 
network of civilian providers to facilitate greater access to medical care.  The TRICARE 
facilities include 70 military hospitals and medical centers, 411 medical clinics and 417 
dental clinics.  69 percent of the TRICARE employees are military members and the 
remaining 31 percent are civilians. 
Eligibility for TRICARE coverage is extended to active duty military personnel, 
retired military members and their corresponding families.  According to TRICARE’s 
2005 Stakeholders Report, there are 9.1 million TRICARE beneficiaries. Reported 
weekly numbers include: 1.95 million claims processed, 19,200 inpatient admissions, 
400,000 dental procedures and a weekly bill of $717 million. The TRICARE medical 
system offers three coverage plans: prime, extra and standard. 
TRICARE prime is a no-fee option for Active duty members and their families.  
Retirees and their families have to pay a small annual fee of $230 and $460 for 
individuals and families respectively.  Under this option, military treatment facilities are 
the primary source of medical care.  The use of a civilian care provider has to be 
authorized by a primary care manager.  The TRICARE extra plan requires an annual 
deductible of 150 dollars per individual or a family rate of 50 to 100 dollars (E-4 and 
below) and 300 dollars (E-5 and above).  Additional fees include 15% of the cost for 
civilian outpatient visits.  Under this plan, the beneficiary can use the military treatment 
centers for free or any civilian facilities authorized under the standard plan.  The 
TRICARE Standard plan provides the most flexibility, allowing members to select from 
military treatment centers and a broader list of approved civilian providers.  The annual 
deductible for TRICARE standard is the same as the deductible for TRICARE extra.   
However there are larger fees for civilian outpatient visits, 20% of covered charges.  In 
addition to medical care, all active duty members are entitled to free dental care.  



























In the reviewed literature, measuring the effects of marriage on income required 
controls to adjust the effects of other influential factors such as age, profession, education 
and race.  However, calculating the magnitude of the marriage premium within the 
military does not require controlling for other factors.  Factors that would normally 
influence compensation have little influence.  Instead, the only determinates of 
compensation for basic pay, BAH and FSA would be paygrade, years of service, location 
and dependency status (marriage and/or children). 
Data for this project were provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC).  The DMDC collects and maintains an archive of manpower, personnel, 
training, and financial databases and conducts research and analysis for the military.  The 
data provided by DMDC contained the basic pay, family separation pay, basic allowance 
for housing, years of service, marital status and dependency status for all paygrades in the 
navy for the month of February 2005.  A review of the data uncovered several anomalies.  
For example, the data contained an E-1 who received a base pay for February in the sum 
of $7,406 whereas the maximum monthly basic pay for an E-1 on the 2005 pay scale is 
$1235.10.  In addition, several members did not have data recorded for basic pay, BAH 
or FSA.  There are several plausible reasons for these anomalies.  It is not uncommon for 
underpayments and overpayments to occur often by error and by request for advanced 
pay.  Data may be absent if the service member had just enlisted or promoted to the next 
paygrade and as such, entries have not occurred before the data was collected for this 
project. 
Members who had data missing were removed from the study.  Next, the data 
were compared to 2005 basic pay chart (Table 1).  All data that were outside the 
maximum and minimum of the 2005 basic pay chart were removed.  The same procedure 




 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9  
Minimum 1235 1385 1456 1613 1760 1920 2220 3194 3901  
Maximum 1235 1385 1641 1958 2422 2908 3990 4465 5232  
 W2 W3 W4 W5       
Minimum 2594 2948 3229 5548       
Maximum 3660 4247 5636 6121       
 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 
Minimum 2344 2670 3125 3554 4119 4941 6666 8022 11338 12963 
Maximum 3661 4327 5425 5934 6998 8576 9764 11008 12149 13769 
Table 1.   2005 Maximum and Minimum Basic Pay 
 
 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Minimum 413 413 413 413 475 501 542 599 626 
Maximum 1667 1667 1667 1667 1873 1998 2193 2560 2578 
 W2 W3 W4 W5      
Minimum 599 628 676 707      
Maximum 2560 2580 2675 2848      
 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7   
Minimum 495 567 567 703 724 576 771   
Maximum 2548 2574 2656 2821 2949 3145 3208   
Table 2.   2005 Maximum and Minimum BAH, Without Dependents 
 
 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Minimum 612 612 612 612 582 668 700 735 778 
Maximum 2167 2167 2167 2167 2548 2656 2801 3013 3173 
 W2 W3 W4 W5      
Minimum 714 756 786 820      
Maximum 2888 3145 3184 3229      
 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7   
Minimum 592 666 755 835 891 898 908   
Maximum 2843 3106 3191 2555 2649 3135 3441   
Table 3.   2005 Maximum and Minimum BAH, With Dependents 
 
The majority of the anomalies found occurred among the entry level enlisted 
paygrades.  After removing the anomalies, the data were arranged by paygrade and 
dependency status (single, single with dependents and married).  For any given paygrade, 
no more than 9 percent of the original population was removed (Table 4).  Of the 313,190 
enlisted personnel in the original population, 10,635 were removed.  Overall, 97 percent 
of enlisted personnel data were used for evaluation.  Among the officer data, 53,198 of 
the original 53,712 officers, 99 percent, were included in the study. 
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 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Original population 13,111 19,377 57,360 60,165 74,350 55,190 23,760 6,809 3,068 
Number Removed  1,158 692 5,170 2,028 842 511 201 21 12 
Revised Population 11,953 18,685 52,190 58,137 73,508 54,679 23,559 6,788 3,056 
Percent Evaluated 91 96 91 97 99 99 99 100 100 
 W2 W3 W4 W5 
Original population 709 602 306 24 
Number Removed  17 3 3 0 
Revised Population 692 599 303 24 
Percent Evaluated 98 100 99 100 
 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 
Original population 6,356 7,052 17,640 10,383 6,967 3,455 108 70 31 9
Number Removed  116 86 154 73 41 18 2 0 1 0
Revised Population 6,240 6,966 17,486 10,310 6,926 3,437 106 70 30 9
Percent Evaluated 98 99 99 99 99 99 98 100 97 100
Table 4.   Comparison of Original Population Before and After Removing Anomalies 
 
Information addressing the value of medical benefits received by active duty 
service members, spouses and dependents was obtained from a research article prepared 
by the Center for Naval Analyses (Reed and Jebo, 2000).  The Center for Naval Analyses 
(CNA) is a federally funded research and development center that provides analytic 
support to Navy and Marine Corps.  The article, "The Evolution of the Military Health 
Care System: Changes in Public Law and DOD Regulations," identified four medical 
beneficiary groups: active duty members, active duty dependents, retirees and dependents 
below age 65 and retirees and dependents above age 65.  For each group, the article 
provides information concerning the allocation of military healthcare resources (Figure 
2).  In addition, the average cost per beneficiary group was calculated (Figure 3).  Given 
that the CNA study was conducted in 2000, an adjustment was necessary to convert the 
average costs of military healthcare into 2005 values (Figure 4).  The average monthly 
compensation received for BAH, FSA, basic pay and medical coverage was then 
determined for single, single with dependents, and married personnel.  The average 
monthly compensation for single with dependents and married personnel were then 
compared with the monthly compensation for single members to determine the percent of 




Figure 2.   Distribution of Military Healthcare Resources by Beneficiary Group 
 
 
Figure 3.   FY 2000 Cost of Military Healthcare by Beneficiary Group 
 
The data were also examined to identify how the population was distributed 
among the three groups. Among the 321,498 enlisted personnel evaluated, 49 percent 
were married, 45 percent were single without dependents and 6 percent were single with  











dependents (Figure 5).  The 53,198 officers had 68 percent married, 23 percent single 
without dependents and 9 percent single with dependents (Figure 6).  Both enlisted and 
officer marriage and dependency status by paygrade show interesting trends (Table 5). 
For paygrades E-1 to E-4, the majority of personnel are single with no dependents 
(Table 5).  E-5 is the point at which married personnel become the majority and this 
percent continues to increase through the remainder of the enlisted paygrades and 
throughout the warrant officer paygrades.  In contrast, officers had only one paygrade, O-
1, in which single personnel were the plurality.  By 0-2, married personnel become the 
majority.  By O-3, the number of married personnel is nearly three times as large as the 
number of single.  From O-6 to O-10, the percent of married personnel rises from 90 
percent to 100 percent. 
 








Active duty Active duty family
member
Retiree under 65 Medicare elgible
 
















Figure 5.   Enlisted Marital Status 
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Table 5.   Enlisted and Officer Marriage and Dependency Status by Paygrade 
 
The calculations for this project were set to determine the changes in 
compensation due solely to marriage or having a dependent.  As such, when determining 
the additional medical cost of having a spouse or child, the increase in medical 
compensation was increased only by $2213 (the average cost of healthcare for an active 
duty family member).  However, married couples are likely to have children and a single 
person with dependents may have more than one dependent.  It would be beneficial to 
know the average number of dependents for single and married personnel (Figures 7 & 
8).  The average number of dependents for single enlisted members is near zero for E-1 
and increases to one for paygrades E8 and E9.  The number of non-spouse dependents for 
officers remains fairly constant, about 0.5, from 0-1 to O-7. 
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Figure 7.   Average Number of Dependents of Enlisted 
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Determining the average basic bay for both officers and enlisted has yielded 
expected results (Figures 9 & 10).  As one progresses from a lower rank to higher, the 
pay increases as well.  As mentioned previously, basic pay is influenced only by rank and 
years of service.  Although not influenced by dependents or marital status, basic pay was 
used in the calculation of total compensation received for each of the three categories 
(married, single and single with dependents).  Furthermore, the average basic pay will be 
used to compare the gain in pay from entering marriage or claiming a dependent with the 
gains from promoting to the next higher paygrade. 
 












Figure 9.   Average Enlisted Pay Per Month 
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Figure 10.   Average Officer Pay Per Month 
 
The Total BAH paid to each group, which is affected by paygrade, location and 
marriage/dependency, is shown in tables 6 through 8.  With the exception of the E-6 
paygrade, the total amount of BAH paid to married enlisted personnel exceeds the 
amount paid to single or single with dependents.  This observation would be expected 
considering that all Navy personnel from E-1 to E-4 are typically required to live in 
government provided quarters unless they are married.  Officers, however, have the 
option to reside in off-base housing regardless of paygrade.  As such, one would expect 
the BAH expenditure for single and married officers to be similar.  Surprisingly, this 
trend was not observed.  The only paygrades with similar BAH expenditures were W-5, 
O-1 and O-2.  One possible reason for this observation is that by O-3, married personnel 
account for 67 percent of their paygrade.  This level rises to 67 percent for O-4 and 
continues to rise to 100 percent for O-10.  With married service members being a 
considerable majority within these paygrades, they should correspondingly account for 






Table 6.   Total BAH Paid to Each Paygrade (Enlisted) 
 
 
Table 7.   Total BAH Paid to Each Paygrade (Warrant Officers) 
 
 
Table 8.   Total BAH Paid to Each Paygrade (Officers) 
 
Another way to consider the expenditures for BAH would be the average amount 
of BAH spent on an individual service member for any given paygrade.  The trend among 
individual enlisted service members average BAH remains fairly constant throughout 
each paygrade (Figure 11).  Married service members received, on average, the highest 
BAH followed by single members with dependents and single service members receiving 
the least.  The only observed exception was E-5 where single personnel with dependents 
received a slightly higher BAH than married.  However, the paygrades for which the 
differences in compensation between each group are greatest were E-1 to E-4.  As 
mentioned earlier, this is likely due to the common command policy of not allowing 
single junior enlisted to live in private quarters.  As such, averaging the total BAH spent 
on a junior enlisted paygrade allocates the BAH paid to a few members over a large 
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population that does not receive BAH. This results in an average single BAH that is far 
less than the average married BAH.  For similar reasons, the average BAH paid to single 
enlisted with dependents is also far lower than for married junior enlisted.  Despite 
having a dependent, these personnel are not likely to live off-base and are likely to be 
entitled only to a partial BAH.  Thus, a more accurate measure of the average BAH gains 
realized from marriage would likely be from paygrades E-5 and up, since these enlisted 
personnel typically have the option to choose private quarters (Figure 12).  The average 
increase from a single BAH to Married BAH ranges from 10 to 21 percent.  The average 
increase in BAH from claiming dependents ranges from 7 to 16 percent. 
 
  
Figure 11.   Average Enlisted BAH Per Month 
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Figure 12.   Increase in BAH from Marriage and Dependency Status (E5-E9) 
 
Similar to the trends in enlisted BAH for paygrades E-5 through E-9, the average 
officer BAH differences remain constant from O-1 through O-6 (Figure 13).  The 
accuracy of the average BAH for all warrant officers (W-2 through W-5) and Admirals 
(O-7 through O10) is questionable because the population is small.  In addition, these 
paygrades also have an extremely high proportion of married personnel.  As such, the 
individual increase in BAH due to marriage or claiming a dependent would be best 
represented by evaluating the BAH differences from O-1 through O-6.  A single officer 
who weds can expect an 11 to 18 percent increase in BAH.  An officer who claims a 




Figure 13.   Average Officer BAH Per Month 
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The compensation received through Family Separation Allowance is not as large 
as BAH or medical, nor is it a regular monthly pay.  Nonetheless, a considerable amount 
of funds is spent each month for FSA.  During February 2005, the Navy paid $7,394,974 
in Family Separation Allowance.  This is also important since the vast majority of this 
pay is received primarily by married personnel and members with dependents (Figure 
15).  The average E-1 FSA was $66 (married), $1.50 (single with dependents) and $0.50 
(single).  Progressing from paygrades E-1 through E-9, the average FSA decreases for 
married personnel and increases for single personnel with dependents.  However, the 
average FSA for single personnel stays relatively constant from E-1 through E-9.  
Determining the average officer FSA resulted in similar problems as seen when 
determining the average BAH.  The small number of warrant officers and admirals and 
the homogeneously married population create problematic results (Figure 16).  For 
paygrades O-1 through O-6, the differences in average FSA among married, single with 
children and single members follows the similar pattern as seen with enlisted FSA. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Average Enlisted FSA Per Month 
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Figure 16.   Average Officer FSA Per Month 
 
The average increases in BAH, FSA and medical compensation were combined 
with the average base pay to determine the realized premium from marriage or claiming a 
dependent (Figures 17 & 18).  Analyzing, the data for enlisted premium from E-5 to E-9 
reveals a marriage premium ranging from 7 to 10 percent.  The enlisted premium realized 
by claiming dependents ranges from 5 to 10 percent.  The premiums among naval 
officers are slightly lower than for enlisted personnel.  From O-1 to O-6, the premium 
from marriage is between 4 and 7 percent.  In addition, the dependency premium for 
officers ranges between 4 and 9 percent. 
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Figure 17.   Enlisted Marriage and Dependency Premium 
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Figure 18.   Officer Marriage and Dependency Premium 
 
 30
Out of curiosity, the gains from the marriage premium were compared to the gains 
from promoting to the next higher paygrade (Figures 19 & 20).  Excluding E-1 through 
E-4, the gains from promotion to the next higher paygrade exceed the premium from 
marriage.  Quite surprisingly, the gains from promoting were at least 50% greater than 
the gains from marriage.  Among officers, from O-1 to O-6, the gains from promotion 
were immense.  Promoting produces gains that were at least 2.5 times as great as the 
marriage premium. 
 
















Figure 19.   Enlisted vs. Promotion 
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There are two ways to view the marriage and dependency premium: the total cost 
to the government and the individual’s perceived benefits.  The cost of the marriage 
premium to the government can easily be ascertained by multiplying the average gains 
from marriage and the number of personnel.  This produced a total marriage premium 
cost of $94,383,395 per month.  The original purpose of this study was to find how much 
the Navy spends toward the marriage premium.  However, it quickly became apparent 
that the Military also pays a similar dependency premium.  Using the same method, the 
total cost of the single with dependents premium was found to be $9,032,590 per month.  
These cost to the Navy are solely based on the differences in BAH, FSA and medical 
coverage.  In addition, the estimated cost of additional medical coverage was 
conservative.  Each married sailor or single sailor claiming a dependent was considered 
to have only one dependent.  However, a married couple is likely to have one or more 
children, which would further increase the cost of additional medical coverage.  These 
estimates are from the Navy’s perspective: the additional funds allocated to married and 
single sailors with dependents.  For ranks of E-5 and above and for all officer ranks, both 
the marriage and dependency premium range between 4 and 10 percent.  The marriage 
premium within the Navy is quite small compared to estimates of the civilian labor 
market marriage premium ranging between 10 to 40 percent. 
A sailor would find additional benefits beyond the increases in BAH, FSA and 
medical coverage.  For example, a junior enlisted sailor might find value not just in the 
increased BAH entitlement.  If he is restricted to living on a ship unless married, he 
would realize an additional value of marriage by having the option to reside in private 
housing.  Unfortunately, this value would depend on the individual sailor and is harder to 
quantify.  Additionally this study compared the earnings of Navy personnel within each 
individual paygrade.  As such, this study does not capture any portion of the marriage  
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premium that might occur via a faster rate of promotion.  However, a married couple in 
the Navy might not view the additional pay as an advantage but rather compensation for 











































VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Several additional studies on the marriage premium within the Department of 
Defense can be conducted.  It would be interesting to compare the magnitude of the 
marriage premium within the Navy with other military branches.  In addition, one could 
compare the compensation policies of other militaries with focus on the marriage 
premium.  One could also measure the indirect costs of the marriage premium such as 
Military Welfare and Recreation services, family services, childcare, education and other 
benefits primarily used by spouses and dependents.  Finally, a study could be conducted 
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